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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION-IMMUNITY STATUTE
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954)
Before a Senate Committee investigating crime, Adams confessed to
having run a gambling business in Maryland. That confession was
used by Maryland to convict Adams of conspiring to violate Mary-
land's anti-lottery laws. Adams appealed, contending that use of the
committee testimony against him was forbidden by a federal statute
providing that:
No testimony given by a witness before.., any committee of
either House... shall be used as evidence in any criminal pro-
ceeding against him in any court .... I
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that the act was within the powers of Congress and that it was appli-
cable to state proceedings.2 Therefore, the testimony given by Adams
before the Senate Committee could not be used by Maryland in its
criminal action against him.
The Supreme Court, with notable ease, found the statute in the in-
stant case within the powers of Congress. 3 It is settled that both Con-
gressional investigations 4 and compulsion of testimony therefor' are
necessary and proper incidents to the Congressional power to legis-
late.'
Under early common law rules, it was permissible to question the de-
fendant in criminal trials; however, the abuse of this technique by the
Star Chamber led ultimately to the adoption of an evidentiary rule of
privilege excusing the defendant both from incriminating himself and
from taking the stand.7 The development of this privilege under com-
mon law, and its subsequent integration into the constitutions of the
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1948).
2. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
3. Id. at 183.
4. MeGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
5. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Jurney v. McCracken, 294
U.S. 125 (1935).
6. In the principal case the Supreme Court again relied upon Justice Marshall's
familiar interpretation of the incidental powers clause. U.S. CoNST. Art. I, § 8.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (U.S. 1819).
7. For an extensive treatment of the history of this privilege under common
law, see 8 WIGMOR, Evmwca § 2250 (3d ed. 1940); Brownell, Immunity from
Prosecution Versus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28 TULANE L. REV. 1(1953).
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United States" and the majority of states has presented a difficult
problem to the legislators: it has prevented them in many instances
from acquiring information necessary for proper legislation.10
While the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amend-
ment may, in many instances, prevent Congress from acquiring the
desired information, Congress can compel testimony without violating
this privilege when the testimony is accompanied by a legislative grant
of amnesty. A witness may be compelled to testify when he is granted
complete immunity from prosecution in the federal courts for matters
about which he may speak;" there is no longer a "real and probable
danger" of self-incrimination." - In this manner, Congress may obtain
the information it desires at the cost of prohibiting prosecution of the
witness for any crime which might be uncovered; the serious policy
questions influencing the choice of this alternative are apparent."
The statute" involved in the instant case merely prevents the use in
any criminal proceeding of testimony given by the defendant before a
Congressional committee; it does not provide the complete "immunity
bath" necessary to compel a witness to testify if he claims the privi-
lege against self-incrimination." The Court's interpretation that the
statute applies to state proceedings as well as to those in federal courts
indicates that the statute is of more value to legislators than previ-
ously supposed. The fact that state courts may not use the testimony
directly is a further inducement to the witness to waive his privilege
of silence. 16
8. U.S. CONST. AIqiEND. V:
[N]or shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself ....
9. The privilege has been included in all state constitutions except those of
Iowa and New Jersey. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, notes 1-3 (3d ed. 1940).
The latter two states have substantially recognized the privilege as a part of their
statutory or common law. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.14 (1950). State v. Zdanowicz,
69 N.J.L. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (1903). See Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633,
649, 16 A.2d 80, 89 (Ch. 1940).
10. There has been much recent discussion of this problem. E.g., Imlay, The
Paradoxical Self-Incrimination Rule, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 147 (1952); Brownell, Im-
munity from Prosecution Versus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28 TULANE
L. REv. 1 (1953).
11. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 8 WioMoma, EViDEN E § 2281
(3d ed. 1940).
12. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896). A valid immunity statute
under which testimony may be compelled need only be coextensive with the privi-
lege it supplants. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Since a
witness may not claim the privilege on the ground that the testimony will tend to
incriminate him under the laws of another jurisdiction, United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931), a federal immunity statute would not need to afford pro-
tection from prosecution under state laws. See Camarota v. United States, 111
F.2d 243, 246 (3rd Cir. 1940).
13. See Brownell, Immunity from Prosecution Versus Piivilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 28 TULANE L. REv. 1 (1953); Note, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 313.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1948).
15. Arcord, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
16. This fact was recognized by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion.
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 183 (1954). It should be noted, however, that
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Mr. Justice Jackson indicated in his concurring opinion that the
effect of this statute works no deprivation upon Maryland.17 Clearly
this would not be true in the case of a similarly worded full immunity
statute, for this would prevent state prosecution. S It is not necessary,
however, to grant a witness full immunity from state prosecution in
order to compel his testimony in federal proceedings.0
Although the Fifth Amendment may not be claimed solely on the
ground that prosecution under state laws might result,20 the privilege
against self-incrimination may incidentally operate to protect the wit-
ness against prosecution under laws of both jurisdictions. This is pos-
sible only when the same facts constitute a crime under the laws of
both jurisdictions. If the witness may remain silent, he is protected
not only against incrimination under federal law, but he has given no
testimony which may lead to prosecution by a state. It has been stated
that a federal immunity statute compelling testimony would limit the
incidental area of protection afforded witnesses by the Fifth Amend-
ment, even though it grants full immunity from federal laws; the
testimony forced from the witness could be used later by a state as a
source of information leading to the discovery of facts essential to
state prosecution.2
The enactment of a federal immunity statute which would prevent
prosecution under both federal and state laws would avoid this cause
for criticism of immunity statutes. This possibility was suggested in
the principal case does not prevent the indirect use of testimony in acquiring other
evidence necessary for prosecution under state law.
17. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 185 (1954).
18. E.g., 11 STAT. 155 (1857):
[N]o person examined and testifying before either House of Congess, or
any committee . . . shall be held to answer criminally in any court of justice,
or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or act touching which
he shall be required to testify.... [Italics added.]
19. Cf. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892) ; 8 WIGMORE, EV.DENCz § 2258 (3d ed. 1940). Note the limitation
placed on the Murdock rule (see note 12 supra) by United States v. DiCarlo,
102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (testimony demanded in federal investigation
of state crimes can be refused under Fifth Amendment privilege).
In at least two states, if a witness in state proceedings fears subsequent
prosecution under federal laws, he may claim the state privilege against self-
incrimination. State ez rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954; People
v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947). In these states, the privilege is
an actual protection against self-incrimination under both domestic and foreign
laws. An immunity statute under which testimony could be compelled by these
states, in order to be coextensive with the privilege, would have to grant full
immunity from both domestic and foreign laws. In view of the inability of a state
to grant amnesty to a witness from foreign laws, it would seem impossible for these
states to draft such a statute. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436(U.S. 1819). Halpin v. Scotti, 415 Ill. 104, 112 N.E.2d 91 (1953), is illustrative
of the situation in the majority of jurisdictions; these courts, holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination protects witnesses against prosecution under
domestic law only, have no difficulty in allowing compulsory testimony under a
statute granting immunity from domestic laws and not from foreign laws.
20. See Counselman v. H1itchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
21. Note, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 321.
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Brown P. Walker in 1896.22 Such a statute, however, is unnecessary to
force testimony from a witness,23 and it would preclude states from
enforcing their own criminal laws upon certain witnesses. While the
statute in the principal case was rightly supported as a necessary and
proper incident to the legislative powers of Congress, 4 it is question-
able whether a complete immunity statute directly affecting the states
could be validated on the same basis.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--DIVORCE-
CONDONATION BY A SINGLE ACT OF INTERCOURSE
Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1953)
A preliminary decree was entered on a wife's petition for divorce on
grounds of her husband's adultery. Before the final decree the hus-
band induced his wife to have sexual intercourse with him in the
belief that he could thus defeat the divorce and thereby deprive the
wife of a property settlement. The husband then petitioned to vacate
the preliminary decree. The appellate court held as a matter of law
that, because of the husband's bad faith, this single act of intercourse
was not condonation.,
Condonation is the voluntary forgiveness by one spouse of a marital
offense committed by the other and bars a divorce action for that of-
fense.- Condonation requires actual knowledge of the guilty act and
may be accomplished by express words or by conduct.3 Since a find-
ing of condonation may be based on conduct, a subjective lack of for-
giveness may be immaterial.4 By implication of law, the condonation
22. 161 U.S. 591, 606-608 (1896). But see Corwin, The Supreme Court's Con-
stru tion of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. REy. 191, 197 (1930).
23. See note 19 supra.
24. See note 6 supra.
1. Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d. 717 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1953). This was a common
law determination of the case. The husband contended, as a second ground of
appeal, that a statute, DEX,. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1528 (1953), governed the case.
The statute provides in part:
On a petition for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the defendant...
proves that the plaintiff.., has admitted the defendent into conjugal society
or embrace after knowledge of the adultery ... the petition shall be dis-
missed. [Italics added.]
The issue under the statute was basically the same as that under the common
law. The court held the husband's act was fraud, which vitiated the wife's con-
sent, and there was no voluntary "embrace" within the meaning of the statute.
2. MADDEN, DoMEsTIc RE=ATONS §§ 90-91 (1931), gives the elements of con-
donation. 2 VERNIER AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 77 (1932), treats the statutory
coverage of the subject in the several states.
3. MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 2.
4. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 90-91, p. 303 (1931). See Phinizy v.
Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185 (1922).
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